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Abstract 
Most of the contributions to Cooperation and Its Evolution grapple with the distinctive 
challenges presented by the project of explaining human sociality. Many of these puzzles 
have a ‘chicken and egg’ character: our virtually unparalleled capacity for large-scale 
cooperation is the product of psychological, behavioural, and demographic changes in our 
recent evolutionary history, and these changes are linked by complex patterns of reciprocal 
dependence. There is much we do not yet understand about the timing of these changes, and 
about the order in which different aspects of human social psychology (co-)evolved. In this 
review essay, I discuss four such puzzles the volume raises. These concern punishment and 
norm-psychology, moral judgement and the moral emotions, hierarchy and top-down 
coercion, and property rights and legal systems. 
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Humans are part of the natural world and a product of natural processes. Yet we are a strange 
biological phenomenon, set apart from our fellow great apes by the richness of our social, 
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cognitive, and ethical lives. A central task for naturalistic philosophy is to explain how the 
processes of biological and cultural evolution have led to the psychological and behavioural 
capacities that make humans unique. Cooperation and Its Evolution makes real progress on 
this task. Across 26 dizzyingly eclectic but consistently interesting chapters, the volume 
brings together a wealth of expertise from philosophy, anthropology, economics, psychology, 
and behavioural ecology in pursuit of integrative explanations that no single discipline can 
hope to provide alone. 
Not all the contributions are concerned with humans. Some chapters focus on sociality in 
non-human animals, including eusocial insects, birds, and bacteria. But although specialists 
in non-human behavioural ecology may find some valuable material here, a brief glance at 
the table of contents is enough to see that Homo sapiens dominates this collection. 
Accordingly (and with apologies to the authors of the chapters I won’t discuss) this review 
essay will also be anthropocentric in its focus. I will highlight four key explanatory puzzles 
concerning human social evolution that the papers in this volume raise—puzzles that appear 
quite different at first glance, but that in fact have a shared underlying structure. 
 
Chickens and eggs 
Modern evolutionary biologists lose little sleep over the traditional ‘chicken and egg’ 
problem. Once we recognize that speciation happens gradually, we see that the question is 
biologically uninteresting: at time t1, there were unambiguous non-chickens developing from 
non-chicken eggs; at some later time t2, following a speciation event, there were 
unambiguous chickens developing from chicken eggs.2 In between was a region of borderline 
cases, and it is futile to seek the definitive first chicken, or the definitive first chicken egg, at 
some determinate point in this region. Theorists of vagueness may still worry3, but the 
appearance of a substantive biological problem dissolves. 
Nevertheless, problems of a broadly ‘chicken and egg’ character continue to trouble 
evolutionary biologists, for the natural world is full of relationships of intricate mutual 
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dependence that cry out for explanation. Perhaps most famously, many flowering plants are 
dependent on specific pollinators, which are in turn adapted to pollinate that specific plant. 
Neither can prosper without the other, and yet there must have been a time at which neither 
existed. How did evolution get from there to here? Which species, if either, evolved first? 
Such problems are not rendered trivial by the bare fact of gradual speciation. Even so, 
Darwinian gradualism provides the basic recipe for a solution. If Xs evolved gradually from 
proto-Xs, and proto-Xs evolved gradually from proto-proto-Xs, and if proto-proto-Xs were not 
dependent on pre-existing proto-proto-Ys, then we can start to see how Xs and Ys might have 
co-evolved, with each incremental change in one enabling a stepwise change in the other. Of 
course, this provides only the bare bones of an explanation. In each case, we still need to 
explain how and why this co-evolutionary ratcheting occurred, and this is where the real 
explanatory work gets done.  
Human social evolution presents a host of highly non-trivial ‘chicken and egg’ problems. 
The story of our divergence from the other great apes over the past two million years is the 
story of an explosion in the scale and sophistication of cooperation, accompanied by rapid 
and radical changes in our cognitive architecture, life-history characteristics, diet, 
demography, and ecological environment. It seems likely that all of these changes were 
interrelated, and this leads naturally to ‘Which came first?’-type questions. As with plants 
and their pollinators, the quick answer is that all these changes probably occurred gradually 
and concurrently by means of co-evolutionary processes. But that, obviously, is too quick. 
For we still want to know how and why these co-evolutionary processes took place. We want 
to know which changes enabled which others, what the incremental steps were, and what 
evolutionary processes drove the transition. We also want to know why no other lineage—in 
the great apes or anywhere else—has undergone such an extraordinary transformation. 
Many of the articles in Cooperation and Its Evolution grapple with these difficult issues. 
In particular, four ‘chicken and egg’ problems stand out. These concern punishment and 
norm-psychology, moral judgement and the moral emotions, hierarchy and top-down 
coercion, and property rights and legal systems. In some of these cases, the author sees the 
problem and suggests a possible solution. In others, the problem lurks in the background, 
unnoticed by the author. In all four cases, there is much we do not yet understand about how 
(co-)evolution actually solved the problem. 
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Punishment and norm-psychology 
One might initially find it surprising that, in a book ostensibly about cooperation, one of the 
longest entries in the index is for ‘Punishment’. This reflects a growing theoretical consensus 
that punishment was critical in stabilizing cooperation between non-relatives in early human 
populations—a point made forcefully here in the chapters by Fiery Cushman and by Maciek 
Chudek and colleagues. It would be both implausible and somewhat misanthropic, however, 
to suggest that modern humans only ever cooperate through fear of punishment. On the 
contrary (and as Chudek et al. emphasize), the evidence suggests that we have a sophisticated 
‘norm-psychology’: a dedicated faculty that acquires prevailing social norms and motivates 
both our own compliance and our imposition of sanctions on those who fail to comply 
(Sripada and Stich 2006). 
Here, then, is our first ‘chicken and egg’ problem. Plausibly, punishment played a key 
role in stabilizing cooperative social norms. Once such norms were stabilized, it is 
straightforward to see why humans might have evolved an internalized norm-psychology, so 
that the motivational role initially played by the threat of external sanction came to be played 
by emotional responses to perceived norm violations in oneself and others. Yet, in modern 
humans, punishment is itself motivated in large part by emotional responses generated by our 
evolved norm-psychology. So which came first? 
One possible solution is that our basic capacity for punishment pre-dates the motivational 
architecture that now underpins it. The tenability of this response will depend on what we 
take a ‘basic capacity for punishment’ to consist in. In modern societies, we recognize a 
distinction between punishment and mere retaliation. If you pull my hair and I pull yours, I 
am merely retaliating—I am not punishing you. Punishment proper is entangled with the 
concept of justice; it involves a judgement on the part of the punisher that a socially accepted 
norm has been violated and that the violation warrants punishment. On this conception, then, 
punishment requires a cognitive capacity to recognize norm violations qua norm violations 
and a motivational structure that impels us to respond to them because they are norm 
violations—and not just, for example, because retaliation is in our prudential interests. Given 
this, it would appear that even a basic capacity for punishment implicates several aspects of 
the norm-psychology it is frequently invoked to explain. 
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Yet co-evolution may come to the rescue, provided we are willing to postulate a gradual 
transition from mere retaliation to full-blown punishment, complete with its distinctive 
cognitive elements. The story, in very broad terms, would have had three stages.4 We began 
with nothing more than violent retaliation, triggered by certain behaviours that deviated from 
established behavioural regularities. This retaliation initially evolved because it was in the 
evolutionary interests of the retaliator: it asserted their dominance, weakened their rivals, and 
deterred future attempts to steal their resources. Such behaviours are well documented in 
chimpanzees (de Waal 1982). This systematic, violent retaliation can be viewed as a form of 
niche construction, since it alters the selective regime agents subsequently face. In particular, 
if violent retaliation is a major feature of social life, agents who are able to forestall 
retaliation by predicting the behaviours that trigger it will be at an advantage. Consequently, 
in the second stage, natural selection built a dedicated system for acquiring the social norms 
one needs to follow in order to avoid retaliation and for motivating behaviour that complies 
with these norms; in other words, selection assembled our norm-psychology. But this was not 
the end of the story. For norm-psychology brought with it the capacity to grasp and accept 
norms (or ‘meta-norms’) regarding retaliation itself. When our accepted retaliatory norms 
mandated a violent response to certain behaviours, we came to conceptualize these 
behaviours as deserving sanction, and retaliation gradually gave way to full-blown 
punishment. If this story is on the right lines, it is a nice evolutionary irony: a psychological 
faculty that evolved in response to precursors of punishment was itself the key enabler for the 
evolution of punishment as we now conceive it.  
One remaining question is why this transition only occurred in hominins, given that the 
basic platform—i.e., a capacity for systematic, violent retaliation—is clearly present in other 
great apes. Social learning may provide the crucial piece of the puzzle. For, as Cushman 
persuasively argues, human norm-psychology represents an impressive cognitive 
achievement: to learn the norms of one’s local community—to learn, in particular, what kind 
of behaviour evokes what degree of retaliation—is no small epistemic feat. It demands 
significant pre-existing capacities for social learning and cultural transmission, and these are 
capacities that the other great apes do not have to anything like the same degree. Plausibly, 
then, the evolution of norm-psychology has substantial cognitive pre-requisites, and the other 
great apes never experienced the cooperative explosion norm-psychology facilitates because 
they never satisfied these preconditions. This leaves us with the problem of explaining why 
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hominins evolved their extraordinary capacity for social learning in the first place (cf. 
Sterelny 2012). But as long as our preferred explanation for this capacity does not invoke a 
pre-existing norm-psychology, the threat of circularity diminishes. 
 
Moral judgement and the moral emotions 
It is uncontroversial that moral judgement in humans is frequently accompanied by moral 
emotions such as guilt, shame, indignation, outrage, and resentment. More controversially, a 
substantial body of evidence suggests that in many cases ‘the emotional tail wags the rational 
dog’: explicit moral deliberation often does little more than provide post hoc rationalizations 
for snap judgements made in the emotional heat of the moment (see the chapters by Kelly and 
Tangney et al. in this volume; see also Haidt 2001). Note, however, that we can accept an 
intimate connection between moral emotions and moral judgement and yet still disagree 
about the direction of psychological explanation between them; and indeed one finds two 
opposing positions on this question in the contemporary literature. 
On the one hand, there are the ‘emotionists’ (e.g. Nichols 2004; Prinz 2007), who 
maintain that emotions are psychologically prior to moral judgements—i.e., that the 
phenomenon of moral judgement is to be explained (either causally or constitutively5) in 
terms of characteristic emotional responses to norm violations. They further hypothesize 
these emotional responses are constructed in cognitive development from fundamentally non-
moral emotional ingredients.6 On the other hand, there is the broadly cognitivist view 
(defended in this volume and elsewhere by Richard Joyce) that moral emotions are not 
reducible to mere complexes of non-moral emotions; that they contain distinctive cognitive 
elements; and that, as a consequence, they can only be experienced by agents with pre-
existing competence in the application of moral concepts. On this view, the direction of 
explanation is reversed: moral judgements, conceived as a largely cognitive phenomenon, are 
either causally or constitutively implicated in the production of moral emotions.  
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As both camps are well aware, this debate holds significant implications regarding the 
evolution of moral judgement. For as Jesse Prinz (2009) has noted, the emotionist view 
dovetails with a by-product hypothesis, on which a capacity for full-blown moral judgement 
came along more or less for free once we had evolved (i) a (not distinctively moral) capacity 
for norm acquisition and (ii) a capacity to feel basic, non-moral emotions in response to 
perceived norm violations. The cognitivist view, by contrast, implies that moral judgement is 
not readily explained as a mere by-product of other cognitive adaptations. For if moral 
judgement involves the application of distinctively moral concepts, and if these concepts are 
more than mere projections of fundamentally non-moral emotions, then it seems likely that a 
substantial amount of further adaptive evolution was required for hominins equipped with 
non-moral emotions and a basic capacity for norm acquisition to evolve the additional 
conceptual apparatus that moral judgement requires. The cognitivist view therefore lends 
itself to adaptationist hypotheses regarding the evolution of morality. 
At present, the debate (on both its psychological and evolutionary fronts) appears to have 
reached a state of deadlock. In his valuable contribution to this volume, Joyce attempts to plot 
a way forward. The key move, he urges, is to draw a distinction between more and less 
cognitively demanding conceptions of moral judgement. The less demanding variety—let’s 
call it moral judgement-lite—is such that it ‘can be built largely from emotional resources’ (p 
565); it is, in other words, moral judgement sensu Nichols and Prinz. The more demanding 
variety—let’s call it moral judgement-deluxe—is such that it captures ‘crucial cognitive 
elements … like desert, transgression, practical authority (etc.)’ (p 566) that emotional 
resources alone cannot explain. The apparent upshot is that we can have our cake and eat it, 
with regard to both psychological and evolutionary explanation. We can side with the 
emotionists regarding moral judgement-lite: we can agree that this capacity is constructed in 
development from purely emotional ingredients and, as such, may well have evolved as a by-
product of other cognitive adaptations. But we can also side with the cognitivists regarding 
moral judgement-deluxe: we can agree that this capacity is not constructed in development 
from purely emotional ingredients and therefore calls for a distinctive psychological and 
evolutionary explanation. 
I suspect that card-carrying emotionists are unlikely to welcome this olive branch with 
open arms. For it is surely a core commitment of their view that it does not merely 
characterize a ‘less demanding’ variety of moral judgement, stripped of its distinctive 
cognitive elements, but rather characterizes all there is to moral judgement in human beings. 
	   8 
If there turn out to be important elements of human moral psychology that the emotionist 
account leaves out, then the emotionists have lost the debate. Accepting Joyce’s purportedly 
conciliatory resolution would thus be equivalent to admitting defeat. 
Yet although Joyce’s distinction between varieties of moral judgement may not be as 
‘pluralistic’ as he makes it out to be, I think it remains a helpful move—and particularly so 
when our focus turns to diachronic questions. For if we want to explain the evolution of our 
capacity for moral judgement, an acknowledgement that moral judgement comes in grades, 
and that these grades vary in their cognitive requirements, seems virtually unavoidable. This 
leads me to speculate that Joyce’s less- and more-demanding sharpenings of the notion of 
‘moral judgement’ might usefully be reinterpreted in diachronic terms, as a conjectural 
sequence of stages through which the evolutionary transition from basic emotional capacities 
to full-blown moral judgement proceeded. For example, building on our discussion of norm-
psychology in the previous section, we might hypothesize the following eight-stage 
transition, in which each step involves the addition of a new capacity relevant to moral 
judgement: 
1. The capacity to feel basic emotions (e.g. anger, sadness) in response to the perceived 
actions of oneself and others. 
2. The capacity to acquire and accept norms, and to recognize actions as violating or 
complying with those norms. 
3. The capacity to feel basic emotions in response to recognized instances of the 
violation of (or compliance with) accepted norms. 
4. The capacity to acquire and accept ‘meta-norms’ regarding appropriate responses to 
the actions of others, and to recognize the responses of oneself and others as violating 
or complying with these meta-norms. 
5. The capacity to feel basic ‘meta-emotions’ in response to recognized instances of the 
violation of (or compliance with) meta-norms. 
6. The capacity to identify some norms as moral rather than merely conventional. 
7. The capacity to grasp distinctively moral concepts (e.g. right, good, just, deserving, 
merited and their antonyms), and to apply them to recognized instances of violations 
of (and compliance with) moral norms. 
8. The capacity to feel distinctively moral emotions (e.g. guilt, indignation, shame, 
resentment) and meta-emotions in response to recognized instances of the violation of 
(or compliance with) moral norms and meta-norms. 
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Naturally, emotionists will maintain that, once capacities (1)-(5) are in place, capacities 
(6)-(8) come along more or less for free, at least as far as biological evolution is concerned. 
For (as we have seen) their position is that moral emotions and moral concepts are assembled 
in development from basic emotional ingredients, in conjunction with a general capacity for 
norm acquisition that is not specific to the moral domain. The upshot is that, once these 
baseline capacities have evolved, biological evolution falls out of the picture: a mixture of 
cultural evolution and individual learning can do the rest. Note, however, that this is 
compatible with the claim that capacities (6)-(8) evolved gradually, provided they did so by 
means of cultural rather than genetic evolution. Note also that an emotionist who accepts this 
gradualist hypothesis still has plenty of unanswered genealogical questions to mull over—
questions concerning the order in which the capacities evolved, the timing of each stage in 
human history, and the nature of the cultural-evolutionary processes that brought about each 
incremental change. 
Those with more cognitivist sympathies, meanwhile, will maintain that the gap between 
capacities (1)-(5) and capacities (6)-(8) is one that no amount of individual learning or purely 
cultural evolution could bridge. They will therefore postulate that these latter capacities are 
the products of a dedicated, domain-specific faculty for moral cognition that evolved by 
genetic evolution, and they will downplay the role of culture in producing these capacities. 
Again, however, note that this hypothesis too falls well short of a complete account of the 
evolution of moral judgement. For there is a world of difference between merely 
hypothesizing that some such capacity evolved by genetic evolution and explaining how and 
why it did so. For instance, did the transition proceed through steps (1) to (8) in the order 
given above, or does this list get the order wrong? Did the relevant capacities evolve 
sequentially, or did clusters of related capacities co-evolve simultaneously? Was selection at 
the level of the individual responsible, or was it selection at the level of the group? These, 
and many other questions, remain almost entirely open. For emotionists and cognitivists 
alike, the genealogy of moral judgement remains a story we have barely begun to tell.  
 
Hierarchy and top-down coercion 
It is widely thought that Pleistocene hunter-gatherer bands were largely egalitarian, in the 
sense that they did not tolerate systematic differences in access to key economic resources 
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(Knauft 1991; Boehm 1999). Evidently, something changed. Modern societies are rampantly 
inegalitarian: a hugely disproportionate share of wealth and resources is concentrated in the 
hands of a small elite. Depressingly, archaeological evidence in the form of grave goods, 
dwellings and storage facilities indicates that significant economic inequality has been a 
widespread feature of human social life since roughly the beginning of the Holocene, 11,700 
years ago (Bowles et al. 2010). The masses at the bottom of the pyramid may not like it, but 
(occasional revolutions aside) the coercive machinery of the state gives them little choice in 
the matter. 
A ‘chicken and egg’ puzzle arises in this context because it appears that systematic 
economic inequality preceded the first known states by several millennia. Inequality therefore 
pre-dates the institutional mechanisms that now sustain it. The question this time is not so 
much ‘Which came first?’ as ‘How can it possibly be that way round?’ Why would the 
majority in a stateless society accept a disproportionately small share of group resources in 
the absence of institutionalized coercion? This is the question explored in the chapters by 
Kim Sterelny and Paul Seabright. 
A spectrum of possible answers naturally springs to mind, ranging between extreme 
pessimism and extreme optimism. At the pessimistic end, there is what we might call 
(following Coetzee 2007) the ‘Kurosawan Theory’ of the origins of inequality, on which 
early elites, like the bandits in Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai, were nothing more than brutish 
marauders who extracted tribute from vulnerable and dispersed agrarian communities with 
threats (often realized) of violence. It is easy enough to imagine how this might have worked 
in the absence of state-like institutions: if the marauders were mobile and struck without 
warning, farming communities would have struggled to repel them. It is also easy to see how 
these proto-tax collectors might have gradually morphed into the elites of recognizable states. 
At the optimistic extreme, there is the suggestion that elites earned their keep by providing 
centralized management of large-scale cooperative tasks with a degree of efficiency that an 
egalitarian society could never equal, so that acquiescence to hierarchy was in the interests of 
the majority.  
In his contribution, Sterelny provides a forceful presentation of this explanatory puzzle, 
and plots a speculative course between these pessimistic and optimistic extremes. He sides 
with the Kurosawans in granting that elites are indeed ‘parasites’, in the sense that they 
exploit the labour of others; but goes on to suggest that they were tolerated by the majority 
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because the intense and frequent intergroup warfare of the early Holocene put a premium on 
strong and centralized military leadership. It is (as Sterelny notes) a surprising inversion of 
the usual group selectionist logic: on this hypothesis, fierce competition at the group level, far 
from disfavouring free riders, was precisely what enabled them to prosper. This may sound 
implausible on first hearing—and it would be, if we were imagining two unconditional 
cultural variants (‘free-ride’ or ‘work’) competing for representation in a population. Free-
riders would spread within groups, but groups with more free-riders would be outcompeted 
by groups with fewer. That, however, is not the hypothesis Sterelny has in mind. Rather, 
Sterelny is hypothesizing a facultatively expressed social norm (roughly: ‘if born into an 
elite, demand an unequal share of group resources; if not, acquiesce to that demand’) that, 
when adopted universally by the members of a particular group, enables the individuals in 
that group to outperform those in groups with alternative norms. 
Although, inevitably, this proposal is largely conjectural, it seems credible at face value. 
It is not clear to me, however, why Sterelny frames this explanation in group selectionist 
terms, particularly given his usual preference for individualistic modes of explanation. For it 
seems to me that his hypothesis can be straightforwardly recast in terms of individual benefit. 
As I understand it, the thought is that if a chief provides effective military leadership that 
potentially makes the difference between victory and defeat in battle, then it is profitable (in 
the long-run) for ordinary labourers to acquiesce to his or her demands for an unequal share 
of group resources: the expected benefit (i.e. a decreased probability of dying in battle) 
outweighs the cost. Fundamentally, this is a direct fitness explanation for acquiescence to 
inequality: norms of acquiescence evolve because, at an individual level, it pays to adopt 
them. It seems optional, and not necessarily illuminating, to frame the hypothesis in terms of 
group selection.  
Seabright, in what is in effect a chapter-length commentary on Sterelny’s argument, 
suggests some further alternative hypotheses. Several are variants on the pessimistic theory, 
highlighting various ways in which systematic exploitation remains a possibility even in the 
absence of instutionalized coercion. Seabright points out, for instance, that inequality may 
have begun with one group enslaving another, rather than with stratification within a single 
group. He also notes that, since large, agrarian societies can afford to lose more of their 
members than small, forager bands, the credible threat of exclusion from the group may have 
provided an effective means of coercion. This points to an intriguing possible connection 
between hierarchy and the redundancy afforded by large group size (cf. Sterelny 2012; Birch 
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2012). But as Seabright acknowledges with refreshing humility, what we have at this stage is 
an unsolved puzzle, a plethora of possible solutions, and insufficient evidence to choose 
between them. 
 
Property rights and legal systems 
Property rights lie at the heart of our economic interactions with one another. In modern 
capitalist societies, these rights are enshrined in law and enforced, where necessary, by legal 
systems. Yet there is at least some evidence that norms of respect for private property (much 
like inequality and hierarchy) pre-date the institutions that now underwrite them.7 Herbert 
Gintis, in his contribution (a condensed version of his (2007) article), aims to show how 
respect for private property could have evolved in the absence of institutional backing. By 
means of a simple game-theoretic model, Gintis shows that, when violent conflict over 
resources is costly, there are often stable ‘property equilibria’ in the evolutionary dynamics, 
at which disputes are resolved non-violently in favour of the agent who currently possesses 
the contested resource.  
Gintis’s argument relies heavily on a territorial analogy. In numerous animal species, 
conflicts over territory are settled by considerations of incumbency: on recognizing that an 
area is occupied, an intruder will often flee without putting up a fight. The standard 
explanation for this behaviour is that, when conflict is costly, it is often in the interests of 
both parties to settle disputes over territory non-violently; and a pattern of default conflict 
resolution in favour of the incumbent is one evolutionarily stable means of achieving this 
outcome (Maynard Smith and Parker 1976). Gintis’s proposal is that respect for private 
property in human societies evolved from this basic capacity for territoriality—and for much 
the same reason.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Gintis points to the ‘endowment effect’, the well-documented psychological tendency of experimental subjects 
to value a good they currently possess more highly than a materially equivalent good they do not possess 
(Kahneman et al. 1990). This effect has been recorded in young children and even in non-human primates, 
suggesting it may have deep evolutionary roots (though see Apicella et al. forthcoming). Even granting this, 
however, I am sceptical that this tendency indicates recognition of and respect for the possessions of others, as 
opposed to mere reluctance to part with one’s own. 
8 Stake (2004) and Krier (2009) have also made proposals along these lines. 
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While the territorial analogy is certainly suggestive, it is worth pointing out one important 
disanalogy. Gintis’s model, like that of Maynard Smith and Parker, takes incumbency 
(current possession) as exogenous to the dispute: incumbents and intruders contest future 
possession of the territory, but they do not contest the matter of who currently possesses it. 
This is arguably reasonable if our target phenomenon is territoriality in animals. For in a 
territorial dispute, the parties contest future incumbency, but the facts about current 
incumbency will often be epistemically transparent: it is often clear to both parties which of 
them currently controls the territory and which is the intruder.   
If, however, the target phenomenon is respect for property in humans, this assumption 
seems questionable. For in human property disputes, an agent’s claim to having possession of 
the contested object will often be itself contested. A may be holding the spear at the moment, 
but A stole it from B, so does B not remain its rightful possessor? In other words, property 
rights in contemporary human societies rely heavily on a distinction between possession de 
facto and possession de jure; and, when the two come apart, it is possession de jure that 
confers property rights. Yet facts about possession de jure depend on legal conventions, 
which in turn depend on legal institutions. This is one reason to think that the legal chicken 
pre-dates the property rights egg. 
Even so, a gradualist move of the sort we encountered in previous sections may help us 
reconcile this observation with Gintis’s account. It seems plausible enough that early human 
groups would have settled on a standing convention (perhaps internalized through 
psychological mechanisms such as the endowment effect) to resolve disputes non-violently in 
favour of the de facto possessor of the contested resource. This would have limited violent 
confrontation, but it would not have yielded a recognizable system of property rights. In 
particular, the concept of theft would have had no obvious place in such a society, and most 
behaviour that we would now regard as theft would have gone unpunished. Much later 
(indeed, probably some millennia after the Pleistocene-Holocene transition), the emergence 
of legal institutions enabled the stabilization of a far more complex set of property 
conventions, leading to the concepts of theft and of possession de jure. A simple system of 
conflict resolution based on de facto possession was thus gradually displaced by a complex 
legal system, sustained by top-down coercion, in which lawful and de facto possession often 
part ways. This, of course, is merely the faintest outline of the transition. As in the preceding 
three cases, all the interesting details are yet to be filled in. 
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Conclusion 
The structural parallels between the four preceding cases are clear. In all four, we find two 
features of human social life that now seem inextricably entangled, and we are left wondering 
how one could ever have evolved without the other. The most promising strategy, in all four 
cases, is to break the target phenomenon into its constituent parts and attempt to construct a 
gradual transition in which those parts were cumulatively assembled, each successive change 
in one enabling further alterations in the other. It is an explanatory strategy that has reaped 
dividends in other areas of biology, and it will no doubt do so in the human case too. But 
there are so many pieces of the jigsaw we do not yet have—and so many alternative ways to 
fill in the gaps.  
In sum, Cooperation and Its Evolution is essential reading for anyone who seeks a better 
understanding of the puzzles we face in explaining human social evolution and a sharper 
picture of the space of possible solutions. 
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